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ARTICLES
DECEPTION, SELF-DECEPTION, AND MYTH: EVALUATING
LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL SETTLEMENTS
William H. Rodgers, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper draws upon six famous settlements that are
known in various degrees to students of environmental law.
Three are a matter of deep history: the 1970 Environmental
Defense Fund settlement that led the last manufacturer of DDT
in the U.S. to cease discharges into the Los Angeles sewer sys-
tem and thence into Santa Monica Bay,' the Kepone settlement
of the mid-70s that followed in the wake of Judge Merhige's
initial assessment of a record-breaking criminal fine of $13.24
million,2 and the Hudson River settlement of the early 1980s in
* Professor, University of Washington School of Law. This paper was prepared
for the State of the Chesapeake Bay Symposium, sponsored by the University of Rich-
moyid Law Review, Richmond, Va., March 2-3, 1995. Appreciation is expressed to the
faculties of the T.C. Williams Law School, University of Richmond, and the University
of Oklahoma College of Law, where another version of this paper was presented on
March 9, 1995 as part of the enrichment program.
1. Environmental Defense Fund v. Montrose Chemical Corp., Civ. No. 70-2389
AS (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 1970). Montrose Chemical Corporation had discharged DDT
into the Los Angeles sewer system for more than twenty years. Jill Stewart, Santa
Monica Bay Blues, L-AL TIMES, Aug. 17, 1986, (Magazine), at 26 (interview with ma-
rine biologist Rimmon C. Fay). Montrose signed the agreement to stop discharging
DDT into the ocean two weeks after the suit by EDF was filed. Id. For a general
discussion of DDT and regulation of persistent pesticides during the same time frame
as the Santa Monica Bay settlement, see William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Persistent
Problem of the Persistent Pesticides: A Lesson in Environmental Law, 70 COLuM. L.
REV. 567 (1970).
2. See Christopher D. Stone, A Slap on the Wrist for the Kepone Mob, in CORPO-
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which environmentalists gave up demands for cooling towers on
several utilities in return for the abandonment of the Storm
King hydroelectric project and the construction of a fish hatch-
ery that was expected to benefit the anadromous striped bass.'
The other three of these "settlements" have a more contempo-
rary ring: the Everglades settlement (celebrated perhaps prema-
turely in July of 1991) that committed $465 million to reconvert
some farmlands into marshes, achieve phosphorus reduction
targets and protect the Everglades' "river of grass" from up-
stream agricultural activities; 4  the San Francisco Bay/
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta settlement (announced after the
elections of November 1994) that involves salinity levels, water
management, and fish survival over a sizeable portion of mid-
California;5 and the pinniped-steelhead conflicts (sometimes
called the Hershel wars) that have gained notoriety in my part
of the world (Puget Sound) and are frequently described (inac-
curately of course) as the only instance known in the U.S.
where a "natural" predator, the sea lion, threatens the survival
of a listed endangered species. The Hershel wars haven't really
been "settled" in any definitive sense (the same is undoubtedly
true of the other five conflicts) but a framework for resolution,
or at least closure of the present phase, does appear in a half
dozen pages of the Marine Mammal Protection Act Amend-
ments of 1994.6
RATE VIOLENCE 121, 125 (Stuart L. Hills ed., 1987). Kepone, a pesticide that was
mainly sold for use in eastern Europe, had been discharged into the James River
through the municipal sewer system maintained by the town of Hopewell, Virginia.
Id. at 128-31. Allied Chemical had produced Kepone since 1950, but in 1973 it ceased
production of the pesticide at its Hopewell facility. Id. at 121-22. A new corporation,
Life Science Products, Inc., headed by two former Allied employees, began production
of Kepone that same year in an abandoned gasoline filling station next door to Allied
facility. Id. at 122. As a part of the settlement of the case against Allied Chemical,
Allied agreed to donate eight million dollars for the creation of the Virginia Environ-
mental Endowment. Id. at 126.
3. See ALLAN R. TALBOT, SETTLING THINGS: Six CAsE STuDEs IN ENviRONmEN-
TAL MEDIATION 7 (1983).
4. John R. Wodraska & Peter E. von Haam, Lessons in Water Resource and
Ecosystem Regulation From the Everglades in Florida and California's Bay/Delta
Estuary (Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California 1994).
5. See John H. Cushman, Jr., U.S. and California Reach Pact to Regulate Flow
of Fresh Water, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1994, at A24. See generally Harrison C. Dun-
ning, Confronting the Environmental Legacy of Irrigated Agriculture in the West: The
Case of the Central Valley Project, 23 ENVTL. L. 943 (1993); Wodraska & von Haam,
supra note 4, at 14-19.
6. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-238,
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II. DECEPTION, SELF-DECEPTION, AND MYTH
Viewing the subject of environmental settlements through the
lens of evolutionary theory' can tell us something about decep-
tion, self-deception, and mythology in human affairs. Deception
can be defined as communication that misrepresents the inten-
tions or capacities of the actor.8 It is seen everywhere in na-
ture, across species and within species, and explanations for it
have provocative implications for the practice of truth-telling
among members of our own species. One explanation is
that the biological costs of deceit are customarily low. It is
easy to tell a lie; it can be done with a word, an expression,
a mere change in body language. A feint can become an act
of second nature, a fib can rush forth without rehearsal.
This lie-telling business requires no long journeys, heavy
caloric intake, or years of careful study.'
In addition, the theoretical literature has begun to accept the
view that communication among animals serves as a means to
manipulate others, not simply to inform them." Under this
view, of course, inaccurate information can be as functional as
accurate information, so long as it secures compliance. Among
humans, perhaps, "the lawyers might be best prepared to em-
brace the suggestion that communication can be about persua-
sion as much as it is about truth-telling. Indeed, a speech de-
signed to move others can sound very much like a speech de-
signed to manipulate others.""
But how can we take the step from the practice of telling lies
to others to telling lies to ourselves? Self-deception can be de-
fined as misrepresentation of reality to the actor. However, the
108 Stat. 532 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.A.); see also S.
REP. No. 103-220, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
518, 535.
7. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of
Pandas' Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. CoLO. L. REV. 25
(1993) [hereinafter Pandas' Thumbs].
8. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Mythology: The
Law of Salmon in the Pacific Northwest, 26 PAC. L.J. 821 (1995) (companion paper)
[hereinafter Self-Deception].
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whole point of Darwinian theory is to explain tendencies, traits,
or behaviors in functional terms that advance the overall goals
of successful life and reproduction. 2 What is the advantage in
misreading the world about you? The answer is provided by the
evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers, who argues that self-de-
ception is a powerful force in the service of deception." That
is, the best liars are true believers. The most persuasive charla-
tans tell the truth as they misperceive it.
Myths present a somewhat different version of a functional
self-deception. The great student of the subject, Joseph Camp-
bell, describes myths as a set of beliefs that explain the uni-
verse, answer imponderables, validate human moral systems,
and conduct individuals in harmony "through the passages of
human life." 4 Thus, myths are supposed "to waken and main-
tain in the individual a sense of wonder and participation in
the mystery of this finally inscrutable universe." 5 Accordingly,
myths provide explanations that can be seen as serviceable,
perhaps because they appear in contexts where plausible empir-
ical accounts are hard to find.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL
SETTLEMENTS: RULING ECOSYSTEMS
As a preparatory step to evaluating the role of deception and
self-deception in long-term environmental settlements, we will
look first at some conspicuous features of the legal problems
presented by our six prototypical cases. At the outset, the very
idea of "settlement" or "management" of these complex ecologi-
cal worlds suggests an off-the-chart arrogance or, at the least, a
conspicuous faith in the capacities of human reason. We are
talking, after all, about major segments of the North American
continent, including the Hudson River, the James River that
feeds the Chesapeake Bay, the Everglades, Santa Monica Bay,
the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, and the
great Puget Sound.
12. Pandas' Thumbs, supra note 7, passim.
13. See Self-Deception, supra note 8, at 827.
14. 1 JOSEPH CAMPBELL, HIsTORICAL ATLAS OF WORLD MYTHOLOGY: THE WAY OF
TE ANIMAL POWERS 9 (1983).
15. Id. at 8.
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What does it mean to "settle" disputes regarding the integrity
and functioning of the physical environment in many regions of
the North American continent? Obviously, "settlement" can
mean many things, 6 and settlements can be looked at from
the perspective of procedures, players, outcomes, duration, or
something else. This essay focuses on four special problems: (1)
representation, (2) prediction, (3) validation and (4) direction.
The representation problem arises because of the limited room
at the bargaining table for those who assume responsibility for
the future functioning of these ecosystems. A few people end up
speaking for many, and only a few of these presume to speak
for the natural systems and nonhuman creatures who cannot
speak for themselves. The prediction problem arises because of
the multiple uncertainties (of data, function, and response) that
lurk behind any of these proposals. These uncertainties will
meddle with the machinery of the Hudson River, the James
River, the Everglades, or any comparable ecological web. Presi-
dent Bush made reference to the "vision thing," which is much
in demand for the all-knowing few who can pull up the chairs
at the select table that will decide the future of an ecosystem
like the Hudson River. The validation principle requires admis-
sion of the possibility of error, and the idea is to subject the
official estimates (dare we say guesses or visions, or self-de-
ceptions or myths?) to the empirical tests of reality. There is a
growing amount of literature recommending this sort of hypoth-
esis-testing, appearing frequently today under the heading of
adaptive management.'7 The last category, the direction prob-
16. Presumably "settlement" means dispute resolution, which can embrace a range
of finality, definitiveness, and outcomes. See GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (Conservation Foundation ed., 1986);
TALBOTT, supra note 3; see also ROBERT PERCIVAL, The Ecology of Environmental
Conflict: Risk, Uncertainty, and the Transformation of Environmental Policy Disputes,
in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS & SOCIETY 209, 222 (S.S. Silby & A. Sarat eds., 1992)
(Part B) (emphasizing "that disputes and the techniques for processing them do not
exist in fixed form, but rather are transformed as disputes are processed").
17. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Protection as a Learning Experience, 27 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994); Ronald H. Rosenberg, Evolving Consensus: The Dynamic
Future of Environmental Law and Policy, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1049 (1994); Daniel P.
Selni , Experimentation and the 'New" Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1061
(1994); A.D. Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unrav-
eling of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. LA L. REv. 1121, 1139-44 (1994); John M.
Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River Salmon,
The Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive Management, 23 ENVTL L. 1249 (1993).
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lem, is included as a reminder that any significant intervention
(or nonintervention) in a system as complex as the Hudson
River, Chesapeake Bay, or Santa Monica Bay lets loose a chain
of events that will unfold in the future in a nonreplicable or
chaotic fashion, filled with surprises. This is much more than a
"vision thing;" it is a concession that no vision will suffice when
we are essentially resetting the starting points in the flow of
historical events.
IV. EVALUATING LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL SETTLEMENTS
THROUGH THE LENS OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY: HOW WELL
DOES THE LAW RESIST THE TEMPTATIONS OF DECEPTION AND
SELF-DECEPTION?
It is now time to look at how the six famous settlements deal
with the challenges of representation, prediction, validation, and
direction. The answer is poorly, or not at all.
A. Representation
The interesting reality underscored in the literature on medi-
ation is the widespread belief that inclusive representation and
benign procedures frequently stand in the way of settlement.
Thus, the literature often recommends the withholding of invi-
tations to the stronger idealogues and the true believers who
make their deals only with God."8 This pattern of exclusion is
frequently reinforced by a system of secretive, closed, and in-
flexible procedures that are deemed necessary to prevent a deal
from coming apart. The Hudson River Settlement is described
as an entrepreneurial triumph for the mediator of choice,
Russel Train, but, extravagant due process was not his way of
facilitating agreement. Allan Talbot reports:
18. Compare Kai N. Lee, Afterword to A. TALBOTr, ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: 3
CASE STUDIES-THE ISLAND, THE HIGHWAY, THE FERRY TERMINAL (INST. FOR ENVTL.
MEDIATION ed., 1981) with JANE McCARTHY & ALICE SHORETT, NEGOTIATING SETTLE-
MENTS: A GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 18-19 (American Arbitration Ass'n
ed., 1984) (pointing out that exclusion carries the risk of a subsequent lawsuit). The
Committees of the National Research Council traditionally have made their science
policy recommendations by "consensus." The Council has found it more difficult to
hold a Committee "consensus" as membership is expanded from the traditional hard-
science clientele to something that approaches interest-group representation.
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Train conducted [the] formal signing session [on December
18, 1980], attended by the press and representatives from
the 11 participants, with a stern hand. There was nervous
laughter when he insisted that no one but he would speak
until every one signed the agreement. He says today that
he wasn't being funny. There was a real possibility that a
fiery speech or an angry word in advance of the signing
might have blown apart the whole agreement.'
The awesome responsibility of speaking for nature also leaves
room for the play of human hopes, guesses, and invariably, self-
deceptions. What did the fish think when their attorneys on the
Hudson River decided to abandon the cooling towers and accept
the $2 million in counsel fees?20 In reality, of course, choices
are never this clear: the cooling towers might never have been
built and the agreement benefited fish in a variety of other
ways, and dramatically so, by marking the end of the Storm
King Mountain project. Still, the decision to "settle" requires
the decisionmaker to discount real tangible gains by indetermi-
nate prospects that optimistic predictions about the future life
prospects of striped bass might not be so. We will never know,
of course, but $2 million in counsel fees may allay ecological ap-
prehension in ways that $500,000 could never do.
B. Prediction
In the art of predicting, self-deception is given free reign,
especially as time-frames are stretched out, complicating factors
are multiplied and condition-dependent qualifiers are enacted.
Acts of legislation tend to be acts of faith, as fulfillment of
19. TALBOT, supra note 3, at 24; see also G.W. CoRMIcK, Relating Environmental
Conflict, Community Mobilization, and the "Public Good": Linkages and Contradictions,
in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS & SOCIETY 309 (S.S. Silby & A. Sarat eds., 1992) (Part
B) (arguing that environmental disputes "are unlikely to be effective vehicles for com-
munity empowerment and may even work to further disempower local minority com-
munities," while also distinguishing three modes of conflict termination-resolution,
settlement, and discontinuance).
20. See TALBOT, supra note 4, at 7 (offering a description of the Hudson River
Settlement); see also Hudson River Group Contends Cooling Towers Would Save Fish,
U.S. WATER NEWS, Jan. 1994, at 4 (stating that the 1980 compromise, which validat-
ed once-through cooling, will destroy millions of fish above Haverstraw Bay on the
lower Hudson).
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goals is linked to a swarm of confounding influences. Similarly,
the six great settlements of which we speak were, and are,
assemblages of hopeful prognostications about the future. Thus,
it was hoped that the brown pelicans would retun to Santa
Monica Bay as the DDT was eliminated from their diet, that
the steelhead would appear in abundance at the Ballard Locks
in Seattle if predators were removed from the scene, that the
Everglades would return to full bloom if the phosphorus was
interrupted, and that the striped bass would rebound in the
Hudson if some changes in utility operations were promised.
The practice of negotiating environmental settlements puts no
formal limits on prognostication, other than the limits on imagi-
nation wrought by the small numbers and controlled process of
the bargaining game. But, again, no small miracles in judgment
and mind-modeling are demanded on the environmental side
since what is called for is an estimate of how a series of com-
plicated adjustments in human and business affairs are likely
to manifest themselves as positive changes in complex ecological
systems.
In this regard, the detail of the Hudson River Settlement
that catches attention is the "hatchery" that promises enhanced
striped bass production even in the face of abandonment of the
cooling towers in the Hudson. For more than a century, the
"hatchery" has had enormous appeal to the legal, political, and
managerial minds whose affairs have come into conflict with
the integrity of the river. Part of this attachment to hatcheries,
no doubt, is the conventional tactical perspective that holds
that the "hatchery" can be important in distinguishing your fish
from mine, and thus offers an advantage in the usual struggle
over commerce in fish. On this small question, the Supreme
Court has seen fit to tie up a coterie of Northwest lawyers for
the better parts of their careers searching out answers to the
fascinating question of whether hatchery fish are actually "fish"
for purposes of the "right to take fish" secured by the Indian
treaties of the 1850s.2 On top of this, the creation of the
21. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), affd in
part, rev'd in part 694 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1982), petition for rehg en banc granted
704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983), modified 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied
474 U.S. 994 (1985).
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hatchery brings with it the hatchery manager, who is brimming
with confidence that "the future evolution of salmonid species
now lies chiefly in the hands of the people who are beginning
to breed them on a large scale."22 Some men, including Lauren
Donaldson, have lived this entrepreneurial dream to manage,
dominate, and control, and will leave to posterity a living,
swimming, self-perpetuating creation called 'The Donaldson
Chinook."
But the generic appeal of the hatchery solution goes beyond
its tactical and managerial advantages to serve the deep-seated
human desire to justify behaviors as beneficial and advanta-
geous. The game theorist calls this the "nonzero-sum" perspec-
tive, and the hatchery has served magnificently as a satisfying
compensatory gesture that would justify the next encroachment
on the natural habitats of the fish, whether it be by dam,
overfishing, mining, forestry, farming, or urban development.
What is the wrong in taking something from the fish when
more is given back? In this capacity, the hatchery "solution"
rose to a prominent social self-deception preferred by political
choice and enshrined in law. In opting for the hatchery, the
Hudson River negotiators repeated a mistake made by hun-
dreds of dealmakers before and after December 18, 1980. While
we cannot settle the question here, suffice it to say that the
accumulating evidence shows that hatcheries do not supplement
natural stocks; they destroy them." Policies built on beliefs to
the contrary are policies that rest on self-deception.
C. Validation
The validation principle requires the inclusion of monitoring
and similar measures that contribute to the self-correction that
adaptive management requires. How well do the six great set-
tlements respond to this need to prove the negotiators wrong?
Is the environmental settlement process an efficient vehicle for
generating hypotheses about the natural world and putting
them to the empirical test? Not likely, it would seem.
22. L.R. Donaldson & T. Joyner, The Salmonid Fishes as a Natural Livestock,
Scl. AM., July 1983, at 50, 58.
23. See JOSEPH CONE, A COMMON FATE: ENDANGERED SALMON AND THE PEOPLE
OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, passim (1995).
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Consider the realities of environmental negotiations. A cen-
tral tenet of the process is that the dealmakers should know
their own interests. Have you ever been in negotiations where
the opponents asserted: "With all my heart I want X. But I also
will hold out for a provision that can prove me foolish for want-
ing X." What will the response be to this commendable display
of self-doubt? How much is a strong case of self-doubt worth? Is
not the response likely to be: "Resolve your doubts, so you can
negotiate with us." Or: "Put aside your doubts, and accept the
$2 million in counsel fees." I predict that experimental features
will not be conspicuous in negotiated environmental settle-
ments.
The experience with Hershel at the Ballard locks shows how
hard it is to expect invalidating mechanisms to appear in nego-
tiated environmental settlements. For a number of years, the
problem of sea-lion predation on returning steelhead runs has
received close attention in the local media.24 The authorities,
primarily biologists and managers with the National Marine
Fisheries Service and the Washington Department of Wildlife,
have intervened in several ways to discourage the sea-lions
from doing what comes naturally in the constrained quarters of
the adult steelhead access route to Lake Washington. First was
the discouragement phase-loud music, large nets, exploding
firecrackers, rubber arrows, and foul-tasting fish. But Hershel
was not to be deterred from his pursuit of the fish. Next came
the capture and transport phase, during which sea lions were
moved to the Coast of Washington, south to the Columbia Riv-
er, and even to the distant waters of Los Angeles. But Hershel
overcame the banishment strategy. In recent times, Hershel has
been subjected to capture and incarceration, and on one occa-
sion, Hershel actually escaped from prison to cross a couple of
highways before he was reapprehended by the authorities more
than a mile away.
A problem of this magnitude called for an act of Congress,
and the legislators responded in voluminous detail with the
Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1994.5 This
24. See, e.g., Jennifer Bjorhus, Sea Lion is One Slick Character-Salmon Glutton
is Back in Custody, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, at B1.
25. See supra note 6.
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Act now approves the lethal taking of culpable sea lions whose
misdeeds are linked to the steelhead attempting to navigate the
Ballard Locks.26 And herein lies the problem of validation:
What is the scientific proposition that drives this law, and will
we be able to confirm or contradict this proposition as imple-
mentation unfolds? Presumably, there is not much doubt that
dead sea lions do not eat fish. Since 1980, trigger-men of one
sort or another, including angry fishermen, poachers, vandals,
have shot 254 seals and sea-lions in the waters of Puget
Sound."
But the Hershel law is driven by another belief-namely,
that the elimination of predators at the Ballard Locks will
enhance steelhead survival and returns. To validate this belief
with an experiment, it would be necessary to duplicate the
returns, control for other events, then observe how the fish do
with or without Hershel. Establishing any correlation between
sea-lion mortality and steelhead survival is a tricky scientific
proposition because of a host of confounding factors.
Are we likely to learn anything from the political-legal exper-
iment that recommends disposing of sea lions? Almost certainly
not. The steelhead run will continue to decline, caught as it is
in a variety of adverse environmental conditions. Proponents of
the lethal control of sea-lions will say that it should have hap-
pened sooner. Opponents will say that killing sea-lions is a
pointless and contemptible slaughter. When the smoke clears,
nothing will have been learned. Self-deceptions and beliefs will
go uncontradicted. Adaptive management will not have hap-
pened. Managers will drift on to the next set of policies (has
muddling through gone out of style?) informed by the next
collection of myths and self-deceptions.
26. Id.
27. JEFFREY A. RASH, MARINE ANIMAL RESOURCE CENTER, MARINE MA.MMAL
SIGHTINGS AND STRANDINGS IN PUGET SOUND FROM 1980-1994: WHO, WHAT, WHEN,
WHERE, AND WHY, IN PUGET SOUND WATER QUALITY AUTHORITY 50-51 (Puget Sound
Research Conference Program 1995).
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D. Direction
Thus far, our short survey of the six famous settlements
suggests that they will prove deficient when measured against
the representation standard and grossly deficient in confronting
the challenges of prediction and validation. How do they mea-
sure up to the test of direction, by which we mean the realign-
ment of events and institutions that at least can contribute to
the undoing of the environmental damage in the future?
To elaborate somewhat, any successful long-term environmen-
tal settlement must address the challenge of successful manage-
ment of chaotic systems. Any serious intervention in nonlinear
systems, such as the social and ecological environment of major
water bodies, can change the trajectory of events, for better or
worse. Because of their capacity to overturn or redirect events
in major ways, these settlements should be measured, tentative,
and respectful of Hippocrates' first rule-do no damage. There
is a nontrivial prospect that the small-numbers players of the
settlement game can find equilibrium points that will leave the
environmental damage unattended. This happened in all three
of the older settlements that announced an end-of-the-story
despite the massive pollution remaining in the sediments of the
James River, Santa Monica Bay, and the Hudson River. Negoti-
ators in all of these cases displayed conspicuous shortsighted-
ness and overconfidence in believing they could "settle" these
affairs in any definitive way.
On the other hand, several of the settlements nurtured, cre-
ated, or directed new institutional initiatives that hold out
promises of future restoration that could not be undone in the
past. The Santa Monica Bay DDT settlement was weak in this
regard, but the area has benefited from new laws that have
produced a $42 million natural resource damage judgment that
can be turned to the advantage of nature's resources in that
part of the world.28 The Kepone settlement gave birth to the
Virginia Environmental Endowment and the Hudson River
settlement to another healthy endowment ($12 million) and
investment in research that will benefit the river and those
28. David Ferrell, Off Palos Verdes, a DDT Dumping Ground Lingers, L.A. TwES,
Sept. 9, 1992, at Al.
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reliant upon it. Even the Hershel conflict has a new institu-
tional dimension, the Fisheries-Pinniped Interaction Task Force,
that can make of the enterprise something more than a group
for approving sea-lion executions.
V. CONCLUSION
Viewed through the lens of deception and self-deception, some
widely heralded environmental settlements lose their luster.
They suffer from representation deficiencies that mean some
interests will be left out; prediction shortcomings that distort
social and environmental realities; validation lapses that immu-
nize happy assumptions from the tests of time; and direction
difficulties that can send future events along unsavory trajecto-
ries that are difficult to undo. But the good news is that all of
these phenomena are manageable, which means that long-term
environmental settlements need not necessarily founder on the
shoals of narrow constituencies, poor prognostication, monitor-
ing deficiencies, and directional shortcomings.
1995] 579

